The Supply of Foreign Aid and the Demand for Asylum[1]

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Abstract: The last twenty years have seen a pronounced increase in both the number and source of international applications for asylum. While the proximate causes of asylum claims are well known and documented less is known about the conditions that may mitigate these causes. We argue that the supply of foreign aid acts to weaken the economic, political and environmental forces that generate the demand for asylum. And we test this argument using both monadic and dyadic (donor-recipient) data over the period 1970-2006.

Foreign economic assistance is omnipresent in the global economy with totals surpassing the hundred billion mark from both governmental and nongovernmental institutions by 2005. Yet despite the enormous sums of aid funneled to emerging and developing countries, there remains a deep dissatisfaction both from the policy making and academic communities as a surprising lack of consensus exists regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid.[2] The concern over effectiveness is so profound that the OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate has an Aid Effectiveness department and the Center for Global Development has a large project devoted to the issue. An understanding of the effectiveness of foreign aid, it can be argued, may be part of a

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[2] Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) argue that the lack of consensus is due to many factors including diverse motives/objectives on the part of donors and the mechanism(s) through which aid is dispersed.

more general political strategy helping governments convince their electorates about the utility of sending their tax dollars; a political campaign that becomes increasingly challenging during austere fiscal times.

We add to the discussion of aid effectiveness by examining a heretofore unstudied area where foreign aid has significant consequences: the use of foreign aid as an instrument of international refugee policy. Specifically we explore whether aid decreases the demand for asylum in developed countries. As documented in figure 1, while the number of asylum claims has decreased since its historic highs of almost 800,000 in 1992 and 625,000 in 2002, the number of individuals seeking asylum remains large. The costs of accommodating asylum demands are far from trivial: aside from the substantial fiscal costs associated with processing and resettlement for successful applicants, some countries of asylum invest tremendous resources in efforts to integrate and help assimilate these migrants. But the costs of dealing with an influx of asylum seekers is not strictly economic as anti-immigrant public opinion translates into real political consequences and has led to fractured and fractious governing coalitions.[3]

Our argument is that foreign aid is a component of a country's refugee policy and that aid decreases the demand for asylum. While we are agnostic about whether aid influences economic growth or distribution, we empirically demonstrate there exists a substantial and significant negative relationship between foreign and asylum applications. But documenting a negative effect of foreign aid on asylum does not necessarily speak to aid's effectiveness. To do this we need to examine the underlying causes of asylum claims and we do just this. Recent studies of asylum (Hatton 2009; Neumayer 2005) identify certain conditions—civil unrest, political

[3] Facchini and Mayda (2008) use two rounds of International Social Survey Programme data and show that opposition to immigrants exists across advanced economies as citizens worry that immigrants threaten their national, ethnic and cultural identities.

repression—as factors that drive the demand for asylum. We argue that foreign aid—if effective—should decrease the "push" of these factors and we find empirical evidence to support this conjecture.

By linking foreign aid to the demand for asylum this paper contributes to a number of literatures. First, it adds to the literature on the determinants of asylum. This literature emphasizes features of destination countries—their welfare systems and labor markets—as well as origin countries—political repression and civil conflict but it does not examine the kinds of foreign policies that are directed by destinations towards the origins of their asylum seekers. In a valuable recent contribution Hatton (2009) takes a step in this direction by constructing an index of asylum policy but that index focuses on entry and admission requirements, not on policies directed outwards. Second, as indicated above, by examining both the direct and indirect effect of aid on asylum claims we contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Finally, by looking at bilateral flows of foreign aid and bilateral asylum claims we add to a growing literature that attempts to combine different global economic, political and labor flows to help create a more general understanding of factor flows across the globe.[4]

The arguments and evidence supporting the above claims are presented in the following four sections. The claims about aid effectiveness are well known so in section 1 we briefly review the literature while constructing our argument linking foreign aid to a reduction in the demand for asylum. Section 2 presents the data and statistical methodology used to text hypotheses derived from our argument and section 3 discusses the results. The final section concludes and discusses opportunities for future research.

[4] References.

I. Foreign Economic Assistance and the Demand for Asylum

Before developing the links between foreign economic assistance and the demand for asylum in OECD countries we must first identify the factors that lead individuals to seek asylum. Scholars have been examining the determinants of refugee flows and asylum seeking behavior for some time. Neumayer (2005) focuses on the factors that generate demands for asylum and finds that those applying for asylum seek out destinations with broader social welfare systems and where there exists the possibility of connecting with fellow countrymen. He also finds, as do Moore and Shellman (2007) in their study of refugee flows, that political repression and the existence of civil conflict are key "push" factors that generate the desire on the part of individuals to flee their homelands. A more recent and systematic analysis of asylum applications by Hatton (2009) finds support for the importance of a broader set of push factors including the source country's level of democracy, its human rights practices—with poor practices interpreted as an indicator of 'political terror,' and the existence conflict that leads to the disruption of domestic populations.

A different strand of literature has recently emerged that emphasize factors orthogonal to political rights and military conflict as the proximate cause of refugee flows and asylum claims. Contributions from this literature focus on the effect of environmental change—climate change, desertification, environmental degradation—and natural disasters in generating the conditions leading to population displacement and eventually generating flows of refugees (e.g., Renaud, Bogardi, Dun and Warner 2007; Norwegian Refugee Council 2008). These factors have not yet been incorporated into a model of asylum demand.

Why would foreign economic aid influence the demand for asylum? We argue that aid has both a direct and an indirect effect. The direct mechanism is difficult to measure because, as

noted above, there is marked lack of consensus on the aggregate impact of foreign economic assistance. But a naïve perspective would hold that foreign aid is a direct expression of donors' interests in relieving economic, political and environmental conditions that give rise to asylum seeking behavior. That is, it can proxy for a multitude of other ways—ranging from administrative assistance to military boots on the ground—in which governmental and non-governmental entities seek to resolve crises in a particular country. Viewed in this way, the total amount of aid going to a country should correlate not necessarily with better conditions in the recipient—though it certainly could—but rather with an interest on the part of the donor community in improving conditions in the recipient. Consequently we hypothesize that foreign aid, all else equal, will have a negative effect on demands for asylum from a recipient countries.

The previous hypothesis, however, does not get at the mechanism by which aid decreases demands for asylum. The conditions that generate flows of refugees and demands for asylum—political oppression, civil conflict and environmental crises—are all conditions that are associated with flows of foreign economic aid.[5] In some instances aid responds to conditions that are associated with oppression, conflict and environmental destruction are all highly correlated with low levels of economic development. And it may be that foreign aid marginally contributes to an increase in political freedom and to a secession of political hostilities. Consequently we argue that foreign aid should, all else equal, decrease the demand for asylum indirectly by conditioning the factors that lead to asylum seeking in the first place.

We test these hypotheses using two different approaches; approaches that correspond to different configurations of data. In the first we treat the recipient country-year as the unit of analysis and examine whether the recipient's total amount of aid affects aggregate asylum

[5] See Nielsen (2009) for a review of this literature.

claims. The second exploits the fact that both aid and asylum applications are bilateral in that donors provide differential amounts of aid across recipients and, likewise, asylum seekers may submit applications to specific countries. In this setup our unit of analysis is the donor-recipient-year. We detail both the data and the techniques used to test our hypotheses in the next section.

II. Data, Measures, Methods

The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (www.unhcr.org) defines an asylum seeker as someone "who has left their country of origin, has applied for recognition as a refugee in another country, and is awaiting a decision on their application." The UNHCR collects data based both on the asylee's country of origin as well as on the country where the first application for recognition has been lodged. We use data from the UNHCR to generate dependent variables for both of our models. For the recipient-year model we aggregate, by year, the total number of asylum applications made to the 44 countries of asylum tracked by the UNHCR. Using this setup we have data on asylum applications from 125 countries over the period 1980-2007.[6] For the donor-recipient-year model we track the number of applicants from a 125 recipients to 20

[6] The recipients of aid (and source of asylum seekers) are: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zambia

donors in every year from 1983-2006.[7] In both cases we take the logarithm (plus 1) of asylum applications and use it as our dependent variable.

Our key independent variable is foreign aid that we extracted from the PLAID database (version 1.9.1, accessed March 2, 2010). The data are provided in nominal US dollar terms and we use data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators to create a measure of aid as a percentage of GDP. The PLAID database also allows us to extract data that is directed for specific purposes and we obtain aid data that is allocated to the following sectors: humanitarian aid, post-conflict aid and government aid. We use these measures to supplement our key result that rely on total foreign aid.

In order to get at the factors that generate the demand for asylum we require measures of political, ethnic and environmental crises. To measure political conditions we use an indicator of political rights constructed by Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls). Freedom House measures political freedom on a seven-point scale with higher scores corresponding to *less* freedom. We also measure political conditions in the aid recipient country through the use of the Gibney's Political Terror Scale (http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/datafiles), a scale that is based on scores of human rights practices compiled by both the United States Department of Defense and Amnesty International. Gibney's measure is a four-point scale with higher scores corresponding to *worse* human rights conditions. We use data compiled by the State Failure Task Force (http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfdata.htm) for our measure of ethnic war. This measure is

[7] The donors of aid (or destination of asylum seekers) are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

coded zero in the absence of ethnic conflict and then increases to a top score of ten for the most intense conflicts.

Measuring environmental crises is more difficult as there is no agreed upon definition or measure. And it is made increasingly complex because we want to measure both natural and man-made disasters. The International Disaster Database of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (http://www.emdat.be/) provides a searchable database from which we extracted the number of people killed as a result of droughts, fires, floods, tidal waves, extreme (high or low) temperatures, and fires for every country-year in our data set. The majority of observations receive a zero—there are not that many environmental crises—but for those non-zero observations (32% of the total) the magnitude ranges up to 300,000 people killed. We log this variable to decrease spuriousness associated with extreme values.

When we move to the bilateral donor-recipient-year set up we add another set of indicators to capture characteristics of destination/donor countries; variables that have been used in studies of both bilateral asylum applications and bilateral labor migration (Neumayer 2005; Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets 2010) and speak to the attractiveness of a given destination.[8] We know from prior research that both labor migration and refugee flows are a product of migrant social networks whereby potential migrants/asylees select particular destinations based on information they have received from family and friends residing in that destination. To capture this concept we measure the stock of migrants from a specific recipient country residing in a donor country at time t. Our expectation is that the larger the bilateral migrant stock larger should be the number of asylum applications between this particular pair of countries.

[8] More detail on the construction of these variables as well as their sources can be found in Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets (2010).

Migrants, whether they be seeking asylum or access to labor markets, will be less likely to pursue destinations where public opinion is against them. It is difficult to find comparable cross-temporal and cross-sectional data on public attitudes towards migrants so we proxy for this using a variable measuring the number of extreme right wing parties that competed for office during the prior election. This is a logical choice as, at least so far as Western Europe is concerned, extreme right wing parties tend to emerge when public sentiment is tracks against immigrants and they tend to run on anti-immigrant platforms. Consequently we expect that this variable will have a negative effect on the number of bilateral asylum seekers. We also include two economic variables that capture attributes of destination countries: government spending as a share of GDP which measure the extent of a country's social safety net and the income differential between the destination and the origin which measures economic opportunities. We expect both of these variables to be positive.

Destination countries may be desirable or unattractive to asylum seekers as a function of their asylum policy regime. We measure this concept in two ways. First, following Neumayer (2005) and Hatton (2009) we include the donor country's lagged asylum recognition rate. This measures the proportion of asylum seekers who were recognized (granted entrée) as a share of the total number of applicants. This is an imperfect measure but it does provide an indication of the country's overall receptivity to asylum seekers. This variable was constructed from UNHCR data.

We also measure asylum policy more directly by coding legislative changes destination country's asylum regimes.[9] The procedure we follow is as follows: unless an asylum policy is

[9] This is the approached followed by Hatton (2009) who codes asylum policies from 1997-2006. We independently coded policies starting in 1980-2009. And a bivariate correlation between

implemented in 1980 code that year as zero. Then for every year following we code policies that liberalize asylum—those that make entry easier, that expand the number of visas or permits for asylum seekers, or that decrease penalties for illegal immigrants—as a negative one. And for policies that restrict asylum we code it as a positive one. Then we sum up the values over time to get the index. Values of our asylum policy index are plotted in figure 2; an appendix containing the actual policies is available from the author upon request. When we estimate our asylum model we difference the policy index to capture that asylum seekers are likely to respond to changes in policies rather than to levels.

Both the recipient-year and donor-recipient year data sets require a sensitivity to the fact that we are pooling data across time and space and, consequently, are likely to violate a number of the key assumptions underlying ordinary least squares. For the recipient-year data set we use OLS but report panel corrected standard errors and include a panel specific AR(1) term to capture persistence in the dependent variable. For the donor-recipient year data set we also include panel specific AR(1) terms but also include a set of donor-recipient fixed effects to capture unmeasured but potentially important characteristics of the dyad (e.g., distance, colonial heritage, etc) that if excluded or ignored would bias our results.

III. Empirics

Table one contains our first set of results based on recipient-year data. The dependent variable is the logged total number of asylum applications originating form country *i* at time *t*. The results in column one of table one square with prior research: countries with higher levels of wealth—as measured by per capita GDP—have fewer asylum demands. But these demands increase as the level of democracy, human right abuse, ethnic conflict and environmental crisis

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Hatton's index and ours shows significant similarity (r=.89). We are grateful to Timothy Hatton for sharing his data with us.

increase. In column two we add foreign aid (as a share of GDP) to the equation and find that it has a negative and statistically significant effect on asylum applications. This may be due, as we conjecture above, that aid is correlated with other factors that may alleviate the causes for asylum seeking. Or it may be due to the direct effect of foreign aid on the proximate causes for asylum. One approach to teasing these out is to include other, more specific, measures of foreign aid, which we do in column three. Here, rather than including total aid as a share of GDP, we include specific types of aid: Humanitarian, governmental and post-conflict. Surprisingly none of these measures is even close to being statistically significant at conventional levels.

A second approach to seeing whether aid is effective is to interact aid – in this case total aid as a share of GDP -- with the proximate causes of asylum to see if the former conditions the latter. We follow this strategy in table two. Initially we note that none of the interactions are, themselves, statistically significant. But it is important to note that interaction terms need to be interpreted along side their individual components. It is easiest to do this graphically and in figures three through ten we graph the marginal effect of a change in one of the causes of asylum for a given value of foreign aid while holding all other variables constant. We also present 95% confidence intervals to identify when the marginal effect is no longer different from zero.

In figure three we examine the marginal effect of ethnic conflict and find, as we expect, when there is zero foreign aid an increase in ethnic conflict generates a positive effect on asylum applications from a particular recipient country. But as the level of foreign aid increases, the effect of ethnic conflict on asylum decreases. By the time foreign aid is equal to 50% of GDP, ethnic conflict has no statistically significant effect on asylum applications as the estimated confidence interval around the marginal effect now encompasses zero.

In figure four we repeat this by examining the marginal effect of political rights. But this result is non informative as neither political rights nor the interaction is statistically significant and the large confidence interval is additional evidence of that. Figure five contains the marginal effect plot for human rights and the picture is similar to that for political rights: as aid increases, the marginal effect of human rights decreases and ultimately becomes indistinguishable from zero. The result in figure six—the marginal effect of an environmental crisis—is a bit more interesting as the marginal effect begins positive but quickly become negative. But note that this is an artifact as the dependent variable is measures in the log scale and the lowest point on the y-axis, . This means that the marginal effect of an environmental crisis on asylum decreases as foreign aid increases but the effect never becomes zero – it would hit a minimum of 0.378 when foreign aid is 100% of GDP.

The results thus far confirm the idea that foreign aid effectively decreases the demand for asylum by mitigating the proximate causes for asylum. In table three we examine the same hypothesis using bilateral donor-recipient pair data. We begin, again, with a baseline model in column one and find mixed support for earlier work. While asylum seekers are drawn to destinations where there are large social networks (as measured by bilateral migrant stock) and where relative income is greater, there is no statistically significant evidence that they either the popularity of right win parties or the depth of the social welfare system plays any role in attracting or deterring them. Nor is there evidence that ethnic conflict or environmental crises play a role in pushing migrants out of recipient countries. We do find that policy measures matter: the asylum recognition rate and the change in asylum policy are both statistically significant and in the expected direction (recall that an increase in the policy index is associated with more restrictive asylum measures).

In column two we add foreign aid as a share of GDP and again find that it is negative and statistically significant. In column three we repeat our attempt to see different types of aid matter and find that they do—both governmental and humanitarian aid are associated with a decline in asylum claims but post-conflict aid does not play a statistically significant role.

Column four interacts aid with the causes of asylum and we again graph the marginal effects to better convey the substance of the interactions. Figure seven shows, as before, that aid conditions the effect of ethnic conflict and decreases its effect, ultimately causing the marginal effect to be indistinguishable from zero. The same can be said of the marginal effect of political rights and environmental crises; in both cases increasing foreign aid renders these effects statistically insignificant. One odd result is presented in figure eight which contains the marginal effect of human rights abuses; the marginal effect here never becomes zero and actually slopes upwards indicating that at higher levels of aid human rights abuses have a larger effect on demands for asylum. This may be due to the bilateral nature of the data in that certain countries provided both high levels of foreign aid and increased admission to asylum seekers from the Balkans and Albania—areas where human rights violations where quite high for a sustained period of time. If we drop these recipient cases from the data the marginal effect of human rights goes to zero.

In sum, we have some evidence that foreign aid is decreases the demand for asylum both directly and indirectly. And the findings are relatively robust as they withstand both the inclusion of other control variables but they provide comparable results across different configurations of the data.

IV. Conclusion

This paper investigates a narrow but increasingly important area of foreign aid effectiveness: the use of aid as refugee policy. We find that foreign aid does decrease demands for asylum both directly and indirectly by conditioning the factors that give rise to asylum demands in the first place. And this matters for policy as foreign aid can be an important and effective part of a country's arsenal when it is interested in keeping its borders closed.

Of course there is a bit question that is not addressed in this paper and that is whether there foreign aid and asylum policies are compliments or substitutes—do they work in together or separately to decrease asylum applications. This is an important question for future work.

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Table One:
Foreign Aid and the Demand for Asylum

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log(GDPPC)	-0.194**	-0.308**	-0.207**	-0.213**	-0.206**
	(0.0600)	(0.0637)	(0.0630)	(0.0616)	(0.0620)
Political Rights	0.0662*	0.0270	0.0551	0.0564	0.0552
	(0.0389)	(0.0372)	(0.0401)	(0.0399)	(0.0401)
Human Rights	0.305**	0.343**	0.344**	0.346**	0.343**
	(0.0439)	(0.0458)	(0.0458)	(0.0455)	(0.0456)
Ethnic War	0.192**	0.211**	0.193**	0.190**	0.190**
	(0.0534)	(0.0598)	(0.0547)	(0.0546)	(0.0546)
Environmental Crisis	0.0344**	0.0297*	0.0348**	0.0340**	0.0349**
	(0.0158)	(0.0166)	(0.0162)	(0.0162)	(0.0162)
Aid/GDP		-1.595**			
		(0.534)			
Humanitarian Aid/GDP			-0.911		
			(2.143)		
Governmental Aid/GDP				-2.176	
				(2.911)	
Post Conflict Aid/GDP					-4.336
					(5.484)
Constant	-402.9**	-409.8**	-404.9**	-406.2**	-404.4**
	(16.41)	(16.41)	(16.66)	(16.61)	(16.64)
Observations	3022	2719	2834	2834	2834

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; models estimated with panel specific AR(1) terms.
All independent variables are lagged one year.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table Two:
Aid Conditions the Demand for Asylum

	(1)
Log(GDPPC)	-0.299**
	(0.0638)
Political Rights	0.0306
	(0.0414)
Human Rights	0.359**
	(0.0534)
Ethnic Conflict	0.240**
	(0.0722)
Environmental Crisis	0.0834**
	(0.0214)
Aid/GDP	-0.223
	(1.762)
Aid * Political Rights	-0.0225
	(0.308)
Aid * Human Rights	-0.212
	(0.302)
Aid * Ethnic Conflict	-0.194
	(0.158)
Aid * Environmental Crisis	-0.786**
	(0.179)
Constant	-409.6**
	(16.40)
Observations	2719

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; models estimated with panel specific AR(1) terms.
All independent variables are lagged one year.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table Three:
Bilateral Aid and the Demand for Asylum

	(1)	(2)	(4)	(3)
Log(Bilateral Migrant Stock)	0.0206*	0.0209*	0.0208*	0.0210*
	(0.0123)	(0.0123)	(0.0123)	(0.0123)
Income Differential t-1	0.0000277**	0.0000290**	0.0000288**	0.0000290**
	(0.00000513)	(0.00000517)	(0.00000516)	(0.00000520)
Number Right Wing Parties	-0.0215	-0.0206	-0.0193	-0.0208
	(0.0281)	(0.0281)	(0.0281)	(0.0281)
Asylum Recognition Rate (t-1)	0.00335**	0.00335**	0.00339**	0.00335**
	(0.000516)	(0.000516)	(0.000516)	(0.000516)
Government Spending/GDP	-0.00312	-0.00289	-0.00327	-0.00277
	(0.00575)	(0.00575)	(0.00575)	(0.00579)
Ethnic War	0.0228	0.0233	0.0227	0.0399**
	(0.0148)	(0.0148)	(0.0148)	(0.0192)
Human Rights	0.0447**	0.0442**	0.0446**	0.0358**
	(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0176)
Political Rights	0.109**	0.109**	0.108**	0.112**
	(0.0141)	(0.0141)	(0.0141)	(0.0169)
Environmental Crisis	0.00155	0.00168	0.00197	-0.0000260
	(0.00381)	(0.00381)	(0.00381)	(0.00657)
Change in Asylum Policy	-0.0248**	-0.0245**	-0.0243**	-0.0246**
	(0.0115)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)
Log(Total Bilateral Aid/GDP)		-0.00357**		-0.00656
		(0.00161)		(0.00628)
Aid * Ethnic War				-0.00137
				(0.00101)
Aid * Human Rights				0.000864
				(0.00133)
Aid * Political Rights				0.000283

				(0.000926)
Aid * Environmental Crisis				0.000161
				(0.000483)
Post Conflict Aid/GDP			0.000608	
			(0.00261)	
Government Aid/GDP			-0.00326**	
			(0.00157)	
Humanitarian Aid/GDP			-0.00300**	
			(0.00147)	
Constant	2.006**	2.005**	2.010**	2.005**
	(0.0348)	(0.0348)	(0.0348)	(0.0348)
Observations	13291	13291	13291	13291

Models include a set of dyad specific fixed effects and a common AR(1) terms.
Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Figure One:
Trends in Asylum Claims



(source: www.unhcr.org)

Figure Two:
Trends in Asylum Policy



(Source: Constructed by Author)

Figure Three



Figure Four



Figure Five



Figure Six



Figure Seven



Figure Eight



Figure Nine



Figure Ten